First Amendment, Free Speech, Defamation Lawsuit, Shield Laws, Retractions Laws; Crystal Cox v. Obsidian Finance Group LLC 13-9731; Crystal Cox Blogger; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari;

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES; Obsidian Finance Group v. Crystal L. Cox; Supreme Court of the United States Filing;


"The Petitioner is an Activist Litigant making a stand for the rights of all Citizen Journalists, Anti-Corruption Bloggers."

Crystal Cox v. Obsidian Finance Group, LLC, et al; No. 13-9731

"INTRODUCTION

Petitioner requests this court to issue a ruling that requires the Ninth Circuit to redact criminal allegations of Petitioner in a Ninth Circuit civil court ruling dated January 17th, 2014, Obsidian v. Cox, Ninth Circuit Case Number; 12-35319; D.C. No. 3:11-cv-00057- HZ.

This issue is a matter that affects all members of the public.

Ninth Circuit Judges; Judge Arthur L. Alarcón, Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.,and Judge Andrew D. Hurwitz, stated:

“. Cox apparently has a history of making similar

allegations and seeking payoffs in exchange for retraction.

See David Carr, When Truth Survives Free Speech, N.Y.

Times, Dec. 11, 2011, at B1. Padrick and Obsidian sent Cox

a cease-and-desist letter, but she continued posting

allegations. This defamation suit ensued.”

Defendant Crystal Cox has no history of posting anything online and seeking a retraction for a payment. This is not based in fact, and has NEVER happened, as the court record clearly shows.

Cox was never “determined” by any court to have posted allegation, then sought a retraction, then continued posting and was sued. This is factually incorrect. 

Cox alleges the Ninth Circuit violated her constitutional rights in alleging criminal activity and has stated in error, the events leading up to her defamation suit.

Cox asks this court to rule that criminal allegations be redacted from the Obsidian v. Cox Ninth Circuit ruling dated January 17th, 2014.

Petitioner Cox understands that it is at the sole judicial discretion of this court to hear this matter.  

Cox prays that this court will hear this matter as these judicial actions will potentially chill speech and violate the rights of other citizen journalists, whistleblowers and anti-corruption bloggers such as Cox.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Petitioner requests this court to decide the following questions:

Does Petitioner, Defendant, Litigants in a Civil Case have a Human Right, Constitutional Right, and right under U.S. Code to be Considered Innocent until Proven Guilty?

Do Ninth Circuit Judges have the legal authority to issue an opinion on criminal allegations in a civil case in which the criminal allegation is not a matter of record in the lower court, has not been adjudicated and is not a material factor of the case?

Does Petitioner, Litigants, in a Civil Case have a legal right to due process of law, in cases where Judges RULE that Litigants, such as petitioner have committed crimes of which Petitioner was not on trial for nor was a matter of record in the lower court ?

Do Ninth Circuit Judges have to find a Defendant Guilty of a Crime, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, or to have been Adjudicated of that crime in a U.S Court, BEFORE they rule that a litigant such as petitioner is guilty of this criminal behavior or criminal activities?

Do litigants, such as petitioner, have a Fourteenth Amendment Rights, Bill of Rights
and Due Process of Law Rights that have to be adjudicated for a crime before a Ninth Circuit Judicial Panel can issue an “opinion” in a highly publicized, higher court, esteemed ruling, regarding that alleged crime?

Do Ninth Circuit Judges have a lawful right to use a New York Times article as adjudicated fact and material evidence to issue a ruling that a litigant in a civil case is guilty of criminal activity?

Is it Lawful for Ninth Circuit Judges to use gossip, hearsay and the rantings of a New York Times Journalist as adjudicated fact, and use this as factual evidence in a Ninth Circuit Ruling?

Can the Court of Appeals Prejudice a Litigant with false and defamatory language in a ruling?  

Does a litigant have a right to have the language in the ruling challenged or reviewed by an independent Court, (for example, the Supreme or another Appellate Court not involved in the decision with the defamatory and legally abusive language that prejudices the rights of the litigant in rehearing) ?

Does the court have the right to defame and slander litigants and deny due process?

Do judges have the right to convict litigants of crimes in judicial rulings 

based on New York Times articles?

Do Judges have a right to deny due process in lower courts by issuing a ruling that convicts litigants of crimes, thereby prejudicing them with a jury of their peers, as they return to have a new trial?

Do judges involved in a slanderous, possibly criminally defamatory statement have a legal and constitutional right to rule on whether they rehear this issue of them acting inappropriately and unlawful in that very ruling?

Is it lawful and within the constitutional rights of a Defendant such as Petitioner, for a panel of judges to use a New York Times article to convict a litigant in a civil trial of a crime of which they have not been adjudicated of?"

" REASONS WHY THIS WRIT SHOULD ISSUE

To establish firm guidelines for all district court, judges and appellate courts that it is not constitutional, ethical nor lawful to render rulings that accuse litigants of criminal activity of which they have not had due process of law in regard to. To guarantee the rights, liberty, equality, freedom, due process rights, and free speech rights under the U.S. Constitution for all citizens, pro se litigants, anti-corruption bloggers, citizen journalists and whistleblowers alike. To guarantee the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of all. To guarantee the rights of due process and the Bill of Rights to all. To end extreme prejudice by local, state, and federal judges whom use their power and position to silence, intimidate, suppress speech, bully, paint in false light, slander and defame litigants who expose corruption in the judicial system and of whom they have extreme prejudice in regard to.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves wrongful, non-adjudicated allegations of criminal conduct made by Ninth Circuit Judges ARTHUR L. ALARCON, MILAN D. SMITH, JR. and ANDREW D. HURWITZ against Petitioner, Defendant Cox and clearly violating her constitutional rights, human rights, and rights to due process, as a matter of law. ARTHUR L. ALARCON, MILAN D. SMITH, JR. and ANDREW D. HURWITZ Stated that Petitioner Cox; " has a history of making similar allegations and seeking payoffs in exchange for retraction." 

Which thereby leads the public at large, media and the lower court in her pending $10 Million dollar Civil Case, to believe that Cox has been under investigation by authorities and found guilty of the crime of extortion or blackmail. As it is ILLEGAL to make allegations and seek a payoff to retract those allegations. Cox prays this Court orders the Ninth Circuit to redact the above statement.

Petitioner Cox alleges that it is not fair, ethical, equitable in rights, constitutional, nor appropriate as a matter of law and rules of procedure for Ninth Circuit judges or District Court Judges to state unrelated allegations, rumor and speculation in an esteemed higher court ruling, that is published to the world and affects the life of Petitioner forever, as well as affects all whistleblowers, citizen journalists and anti-corruption bloggers like her. Petitioner Cox alleges that it is an abuse of power and process, and an extreme violation of her human and civil rights, for Judges to use hearsay and rumors as adjudicated fact in an esteemed, higher court process, and to seek revenge, retaliate, and use extreme prejudice against Petitioner and litigants like her by using a prestigious court ruling to paint Petitioner in false light, slander and defame Petitioner and cause her a lifetime of irreparable harm. 

Petitioner alleges that it is the duty of Ninth Circuit judges to report anyone they deem a danger to the public. If ARTHUR L. ALARCON, MILAN D. SMITH, JR. and ANDREW D. HURWITZ believe Cox to have a history of extortionate or blackmailing conduct, then it is their duty as public servants to order a criminal investigation by the proper authorities and it is NOT their duty, nor legal right to simply, flat out state, that Cox has a history of these criminal actions and thereby defame and slander Cox and put her under extreme prejudice as she heads back to the lower court Pro Se to face a $10 Million dollar civil court proceeding.

Petitioner and bloggers, whistleblowers, citizen journalists like her, face extreme prejudice in the courts, as they are oftentimes exposing judges, attorneys and people in powerful positions such as CEO’s and Politicians. This court ruling, essentially gives the rights to all Judges at every level of our court system, and essentially all institutional press “traditional journalists” to simply accuse litigants of crimes, activities, or unethical behavior, based on gossip and hearsay of an institutional press journalists such as Kashmir Hill of Forbes or David Carr of the New York Times, and have that be stated in a Ninth Circuit ruling as adjudicated fact. Petitioner alleges that it violates her constitutional rights and the rights of those who engage in the same online activity as her, for Judges to essentially take “pot shots”, add in gossip and hearsay into a ruling and thereby slander, defame and ruin the life of the litigant. 

Especially in cases such as the petitioner where she faces a retrial in a $10 million dollar civil case where she is indigent and cannot afford an attorney and this criminal accusation prejudices her lower court ruling before the trial even begins.

Petitioner alleges that allowing Ninth Circuit judges to state arbitrary allegations and accusations in authoritative higher court opinions, will potentially chill the online speech of all bloggers, whistleblowers, citizen journalists. As they will fear the same thing happening to them. This is a critical first amendment issue. And a critical issue of due process laws, the fourteenth amendment, civil rights and human rights. Petitioner alleges that she has a constitutional right to due process in the criminal justice system and that it violates her constitutional rights for higher court, esteemed judges to rule on matters of her alleged criminal activity BEFORE she has been adjudicated or under investigation by the proper courts and legal procedure in the criminal justice system. These accusations by Ninth Circuit judges prejudice the litigants such as petitioner in the re-trial at the D.C. level and put them under extreme prejudice in all matters of their life, even things as simple as renting a home or getting a job. 

Those researching litigants such as petitioner find a higher court ruling, issued by esteemed judges in a powerful position of which the public at large deems to be of the utmost authority, in which accuses the litigant of criminal activities, of extortionate behavior. 

This is a violation of Petitioners rights of due process and constitutional rights, as she now faces extreme prejudice, hate, inequality and duress in all aspects of her life. She is deemed a criminal, when she has not had due process in the criminal justice system. This precedence now makes it so that judges everywhere can do this same thing to essentially punish, retaliate against whistleblowers, citizen journalists and anti-corruption bloggers. Does Petitioner, Defendant, Litigants in a Civil Case have a Human Right, Constitutional Right, and right under U.S. Code to be Considered Innocent until Proven Guilty? 

Petitioner alleges that she has a constitutional right for it to be proven, as a matter of law, "beyond a reasonable doubt" that she is guilty of a crime, before Judges are allowed, by law, to state those allegations in a court ruling, a court opinion. Beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest standard of proof that must be met in any trial. In civil litigation, the standard of proof is either proof by a preponderance of the evidence or proof by clear and convincing evidence. There was neither in the Ninth Circuit appeal of Obsidian v. Cox. Petitioner Cox alleges that Judges must have “Clear and Convincing Proof” beyond a reasonable doubt BEFORE they are, by law allowed to state such allegations in a higher court ruling. Cox was not on trial for crimes or civil matters involving allegations, investigations or even a cause of action regarding posting content or allegations of others online and then seeking a payoff to remove those allegations, (aKa Extortion or Blackmail). 

Cox was on trial for defamation, and that this was the only cause of action. 

There was no "seeking a payoff" to remove allegations, as a material factor of Obsidian v. Cox nor a factor in this case what so ever, therefore it was not a matter of record and cannot legally be brought into the Ninth Circuit proceeding, and certainly not, as a matter of law and constitutional rights, be stated in a Ninth Circuit court of appeals ruling, opinion. 

Petitioner Cox alleges that her Due Process of Law, Fourteenth Amendment Rights, and her rights under the Bill of Rights, have been violated by Judges accusing her of criminal activity in rulings / opinions in civil cases of which these crimes have nothing to do with. Cox alleges this is retaliation for her exposing corruption that involves judges, and people with financial and political power. Petitioner Cox alleges that she has a fundamental, constitutional guarantee that all legal proceedings will be fair and that one will be given notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard before the government acts to take away one's life, liberty, or property. 

Yet Cox was not given notice of the crimes alleged, nor a way to present her side. 

Cox was not given due process, as a matter of law and constitutional rights and Cox has thus lost her life as she knew it, her liberty and has lost personal property in this matter. The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment asserts that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 

This amendment restricts the powers of the federal government and applies only to actions by it. Petitioner Cox was not given due process, and was simply ruled guilty of criminal activities, with a New York Times article as material evidence in the matter and was thereby “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,declares,"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" (§ 1). Yet petitioner Cox was not given due process in the criminal justice system nor has Cox been adjudicated for or even under investigation for the crime of extortion, yet high court judges accused Cox of extortionate behavior in a ruling of a civil case, a defamation case, unrelated in it’s material fact, evidence and testimony to the crime of extortion and to of having “a history of making similar allegations and seeking payoffs in exchange for retraction.”, which is essentially the felony crime of blackmail, or extortion. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has also been interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in the twentieth century to incorporate protections of the Bill of Rights, so that those protections apply to the states as well as to the federal government. 

Thus, the Due Process Clause serves as the means whereby the Bill of Rights has become binding on state governments as well as on the federal government. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is intended to protect individuals such as Petitioner from arbitrary actions by state as well as federal governments, which includes the arbitrary actions of an esteemed higher court judicial panel in accusing petition and future litigants like her, of criminal activity of which was not a material factor in her case, and was simply hearsay by a traditional journalist of the institutional press, in this case a New York Time journalist, David Carr.

Due process requires that the procedures by which laws are applied must be evenhanded, and in this case there was severe prejudice and inequality and Cox has thereby suffered harm, and wishes this court to remedy this ruling to protect future anti-corruption bloggers, citizen journalists and whistle blowers such as herself. Petitioner Cox alleges that, under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, and other human rights and civil rights laws, and constitutional amendments, that the actions of these judges deprived her of "fundamental fairness" and of Civil Rights under the Due Process Clause. 

And now has the potential to do so to ALL future anti-corruption bloggers, citizen journalists and whistle blowers such as herself. 

And with this gives far reaching, unconstitutional powers to the institutional press and traditional journalists to publish gossip, hearsay and allegations and have Ninth Circuit judges and judges across the land, use these traditional journalists “opinion”, “writings”, “allegations” as adjudicated facts, hard and fast evidence, and sworn testimony that gives them the right to issue opinions and rulings that flat out accuse litigants such as petitioner of criminal activity of which they have not had due process of law in regard to. The Bill of Rights contains provisions that are central to procedural due process. 

These protections give a person a number of rights and freedoms including the right to be told of the crime being charged; the right to cross-examine witnesses; the right to be represented by an attorney; freedom from Cruel and Unusual Punishment; and the right to demand that the state prove any charges Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. 

Petitioner Cox was deprived of these rights, as Judges simply portrayed to the world she was guilty of criminal acts without having due process and without being told of the crime being charged; the right to cross-examine witnesses; the right to be represented by an attorney; freedom from Cruel and Unusual Punishment; and the right to demand that the state prove any charges Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. The Decision of the Ninth Circuit to allow statement of non-adjudicated criminal accusations to be put into a ruling in a civil case, whereby the litigant has not had due process for those allegations is Clearly Incorrect. Ninth Circuit Judges ARTHUR L. ALARCON, MILAN D. SMITH, JR. and ANDREW D. HURWITZ erred in stating that Cox had a history of these criminal activities and erred in stating the New York Times as their evidence of fact and material facts of law. Petitioner Cox alleges that Ninth Circuit Judges do not have a lawful, constitutional right to issue an opinion on criminal allegations in a civil case in which the criminal allegation is not a matter of record in the lower court, has not been adjudicated and is not a material factor of the case. Petitioner Cox alleges that she was denied a legal right to due process of law in this ruling that slandered and defamed her, and painted her in false light, thereby affecting the rest of her life. Petitioner Cox alleges that Ninth Circuit Judges ARTHUR L. ALARCON, MILAN D. SMITH, JR. and ANDREW D. HURWITZ did not find Cox guilty of these allegations beyond a reasonable doubt nor did they adjudicate Cox, charge Cox with these allegations nor use adjudicated facts in issuing their judicial authority (opinion), (ruling). 

And that it was an error to rule that Cox had a history of such criminal actions when Cox was not allowed due process and constitutional rights regarding these allegations. Petitioner Cox alleges that Ninth Circuit Judges ARTHUR L. ALARCON, MILAN D. SMITH, JR. and ANDREW D. HURWITZ violated her Fourteenth Amendment Rights, Bill of Rights and Due Process of Law Rights by alleging Cox committed these criminal actions of which she had not been charged by a lower court nor the criminal justice system, as a matter of law. Petitioner Cox alleges that Ninth Circuit Judges ARTHUR L. ALARCON, MILAN D. SMITH, JR. and ANDREW D. HURWITZ prejudiced her substantial rights, and this was not a harmless error as Cox now faces extreme hate, prejudice, slander and defamation and has a other judicial proceedings that are now prejudiced against her. If Ninth Circuit Judges ARTHUR L. ALARCON, MILAN D. SMITH, JR. and ANDREW D. HURWITZ believed Cox to have committed theses Criminal acts, they SHOULD go through due process of law. Judges are NOT above the law.

CONCLUSION

I Pray that this esteemed panel, this court, send a clear message to the Ninth Circuit, and essentially all Appellate Judges and all judges across our court system, that it is not ok, not ethical, not constitutional nor lawful to ad lib, make criminal allegations, introduce new case information into the appeal process, slander and defame litigants, and abuse the power of their process and esteemed role to retaliate against whistleblowers, citizen journalists, and anti-corruption bloggers in every town in the United States and essential the world. The Obsidian v. Cox, Ninth Circuit ruling is known well, worldwide and is the most prominent case to date of a blogger making a court rule on whether a blogger has rights equal to a journalist when it comes to the First Amendment, Shield Laws, Retraction Laws and Free Speech Rights. 

This is a massive human rights and civil rights issue, as now all who expose corruption and break news, report on what is really happening in small towns, big cities and essential everywhere, have the same rights in the courtroom as does traditional journalists and the institutional press aKa big media. Therefore it is imperative that this ruling does not be tainted with giving those same traditional journalists of the institutional press, super powers to have that same blogger alienated, outcast, painted in false light, prejudiced in other court proceedings, and have the world at large believe them to be a criminal and therefore not taken serious that in which they are exposing or reporting on. This ruling that gave equality, seemed to have took it away in the very same ruling. Petition Cox has NEVER, not even once in her life, posted anything online with the intention of seeking a payment for a retraction. 

Cox has NEVER asked for money to remove anything she has posted online, and yet Ninth Circuit Judges ARTHUR L. ALARCON, MILAN D. SMITH, JR. and ANDREW D. HURWITZ are claiming, in a Ninth Circuit ruling that Cox has a “History” of doing such actions, seriously criminal, unconstitutional and unethical action. 

As if Cox has a pattern and history of illegal, unethical behavior, of which there is NO History or Pattern. If these judges are allowed to put these unsubstantiated, unadjudicated, extremely biased and prejudice criminal allegations into a ruling in a civil case, then this will chill the speech of those in the future wishing to, wanting, or trying to expose corruption in their area of expertise, town, or state.

In Truth Petitioner Cox has dedicated her life, lost everything and been under extreme threats, retaliation, and extreme prejudice for nearly a decade, all because she did the right thing and stood up for others, for strangers and used her internet marketing skills to give voice to the victims of corrupt detectives, county commissioners, judges, cops, politicians, real estate companies, banks, finance companies, and victims of human trafficking, pedophilia, rape, and severe abuse.

Cox was RULED guilty of a crime of which she was not on trial for, was not adjudicated for and was not under investigation for. A crime that was NOT a material factor in Obsidian Finance Group v. Crystal Cox. 

It is not legal, due process, nor constitutional for these judges to have stated these false, unadjudicated allegations. Petitioner respectfully request that the Ninth Circuit Court amend its opinion to withhold the sentence that now says, Cox apparently has a history of making similar allegations and seeking payoffs in exchange for retraction. See David Carr, When Truth Survives Free Speech , N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 2011, at B1. 

A judicial assertion of misconduct by a named person, even a judicial assertion modified with the word “apparently,” could be based on the record in a case, or on authoritative findings by another court. But it ought not be based on a newspaper column, which was written without the benefit of cross-examination, sworn testimony, or the other safeguards of the judicial process. 

The claims in the columnist’s assertion are neither facts found by a fact finder nor facts subject to judicial notice under Fed. R. Evid. 201. Adding this statement to the Obsidian v. Cox ruling dated January 17th, 2014 is Legally Flawed and Has Far-Reaching Consequences, and is thereby Warranting Review in This Case. This issue affects all who are reporting news, all citizen journalists, all victims of corruption at every level and all whistleblowers. 

If a Ninth Circuit panel can rule that any individual has committed crimes without that person having been investigated or given due process for those allegations, and use a New York Times article as evidence of those crimes, then this potentially affects every citizen in the United States and is a very important issue for all lawmakers, citizens, and the judicial process as a whole.

The Court should grant the petition. "  

Source of Crystal Cox Blogger Supreme Court Filing

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1yBV1MgaxPbjqoYxC3op2241oidez4pEW2WJ2P-Lg8Hk/edit

Crystal Cox, Free Speech Case fighting to Equal rights of bloggers, Citizen Journalists, Whistleblowers as New York Times, Forbes and other traditional, mainstream media.

To Read the writ of certiorari Filing by Crystal Cox, Pro Se, Click Below
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1yBV1MgaxPbjqoYxC3op2241oidez4pEW2WJ2P-Lg8Hk/edit

UCLA, Law Professor, Attorney Eugene Volokh 

Motion to Rehear Click Below

http://www.scribd.com/doc/204438383/Eugene-Volokh-Motion-to-Rehear-Obsidian-v-Cox

Obsidian Finance Group v. Crystal L. Cox; 

Supreme Court of the United States Filing;
Crystal Cox v. Obsidian Finance Group, LLC, et al; No. 13-9731

No. 13-9731

Crystal Cox, Petitioner
v.
Obsidian Finance Group, LLC, et al.

Docketed: April 16, 2014

Lower Court: 
United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

  Case Nos.: (12-35238, 12-35319)
  Decision Date: January 17, 2014
  Rehearing Denied: March 5, 2014

Apr 8 2014 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari and 

motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. 

(Response due May 16, 2014)

Attorneys for Petitioner:
Crystal L. Cox P.O. Box 2027
Port Townsend, WA  98368
Party name: Crystal Cox
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/13-9731.htm

Crystal Cox on Why she Filed Motion to Rehear in the Ninth Circuit

(Playlist of 2, Audio OnlyCrystal Cox on Motion to Rehear)

Crystal Cox, Obsidian v. Cox Update March 12th, 2014

How Extortion Entered into the Obsidian Finance v. Crystal Cox Case, 

and a bit about the Summit Bankruptcy Case

Other Links for Updates

https://certpool.com/dockets/13-9731

Crystal Cox First Amendment Case

More on the Crystal Cox Blogger; Crystal Cox First Amendment Case, 

Equality of Bloggers; Ninth Circuit Appeals WIN for ALL Citizen Journalists,

 Anti-Corruption Bloggers, and Whistleblowers

http://www.crystalcoxcase.com/

http://ninthcircuitcrystalcoxappeal.blogspot.com/

More on Obsidian Finance Group

http://obsidianfinancesucks.blogspot.com/

http://www.obsidianfinancesucks.com/

http://kevinpadrick.blogspot.com/

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari; 

Supreme Court of the United States Filing; 

Crystal Cox v. Obsidian Finance Group LLC 13-9731

Supreme Court of the United States Filing; Crystal Cox v. Obsidian Finance Group, LLC, et al; No. 13-9731

Crystal Cox, Petitioner

v.

Obsidian Finance Group, LLC, et al.

Docketed:    April 16, 2014
Supreme Court of the United States



Date of Filing; Apr 8 2014                     

Proceedings  and  Orders

Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. 
(Response due May 16, 2014)

Attorneys for Petitioner:  Crystal L. Cox, Pro Se

Docket Watch Click Below http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/13-9731.htm To Read the writ of certiorari Filing by Crystal Cox, Pro Se, Click Below https://docs.google.com/document/d/1yBV1MgaxPbjqoYxC3op2241oidez4pEW2WJ2P-Lg8Hk/edit UCLA, Law Professor, Attorney Eugene Volokh Motion to Rehear Click Below http://www.scribd.com/doc/204438383/Eugene-Volokh-Motion-to-Rehear-Obsidian-v-Cox Other Links for Updates https://certpool.com/dockets/13-9731 Crystal Cox v. Obsidian Finance Group, LLC, et al., No. 13-9731

Cited on Page 176; Obsidian Finance Group v. Cox

http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=rCcDAwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR1&ots=0pMeAPqIVJ&sig=Q5Dqs61rFPOucOg5PdDdEoDm4Fo#v=onepage&q&f=false

GUS GHANAM v. JOSEPH MUNEM

"

GUS GHANAM, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOHN DOES, Defendants, and
JOSEPH MUNEM, Appellant.

No. 312201.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

January 2, 2014.

Before: TALBOT, P.J., and WILDER and STEPHENS, JJ.

WILDER, J.

Appellant Joseph Munem appeals by leave granted from the circuit court's order denying his motion for a protective order barring discovery. Plaintiff seeks to depose Munem to discover the identities of persons who allegedly made defamatory statements about him on an Internet message board. Munem seeks to keep the identities of those people anonymous. We reverse and remand for the trial court to enter judgment in favor of defendants."

"The context and forum in which statements appear also affect whether a reasonable reader would interpret them as asserting provable facts. Courts that have considered the matter have concluded that Internet message boards and similar communications are generally regarded as containing statements of pure opinion rather than statements or implications of actual, provable fact. See Summit Bank v Rogers, 206 Cal App 4th 669, 696-698; 142 Cal Rptr 3d 40 (Cal App, 2012); Sandals Resorts Int'l Ltd v Google, Inc, 925 NYS2d 407, 415-416; 86 AD3d 32 (NY App, 2011); Obsidian Financial Group v Cox, 812 F Supp 2d 1220, 1223-1224 (D Oregon, 2011); Cahill, 884 A2d at 465. "[A]ny reader familiar with the culture of . . . most electronic bulletin boards . . . would know that board culture encourages discussion participants to play fast and loose with facts. . . . Indeed, the very fact that most of the posters remain anonymous, or pseudonymous, is a cue to discount their statements accordingly." Summit Bank, 206 Cal App 4th at 696-697 (quotation marks and some brackets omitted)."

Source and More

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15374702573856309138&hl=en&as_sdt=5,48&sciodt=6,48

University of Washington; Lauren Guicheteau; "WHAT IS THE MEDIA IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET? DEFAMATION LAW AND THE BLOGOSPHERE"; Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox

"Excerpt; INTRODUCTION

While blogs have become a popular source of information and commentary, the content of many blogs is subject to little oversight or accountability. When defamatory information is posted on a blog, courts must determine whether bloggers are akin to members of the media with respect to First Amendment and state law protections.

Recently, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon ruled in Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox that the defendant, Crystal Cox, a self-described "investigative blogger," was not considered a member of the media for purposes of a defamation claim.

1 Cox ran a website, www.obsidianfinancesucks.com, on which she published statements critical of plaintiffs Obsidian Finance Group and Kevin Padrick.

2 These statements accused the plaintiffs of theft, tax fraud, and lies. While many of her statements were seen as opinions, the court found a few to be potentially defamatory.

3 When a case involves a media defendant and a plaintiff who is a private figure, 4 the plaintiff must show that the publication of defamatory material was at least negligent. However, the Obsidian court concluded that non-media defendants are held to a standard of strict liability for defamation. W

hen the court found that the defendant was not part of the media, the blogger became subject to strictly liability for her statements to the cost of $ 2.5 million in damages. This situation highlights the impact the definition of "media" can have on a defamation defendant."

Source
https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=8+Wash.+J.L.+Tech.+%26+Arts+573&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=467eea358d53c027f278459ae8672e84

Ninth Circuit Grants First Amendment Protection to Bloggers

"

Online news analysis and reporting through blogs, tweets, or social media posts has experienced a rapid growth in popularity, but remains distinguished from traditional media outlets such as newspapers or TV networks.  

The gap is closing, however, and online publishers took another step towards legitimacy this week when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that bloggers are afforded the same protection from defamation lawsuits as institutional media outlets enjoy.

Ninth Circuit Grants First Amendment Protection to Bloggers

In Obsidian Finance Group v Cox, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit seems to have settled the question of blogger liability for defamation by offering internet writers the same protections historically afforded to traditional Media.  

Obsidian emerged as a case between Obsidian Finance Group and blogger Crystal Cox over blog posts published by Cox accusing Obsidian of fraud, money laundering, and other financial crimes when the company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  Although most of the statements made by Cox were constitutionally protected as opinion, one statement accusing Obsidian of tax fraud resulted in a $2.5 million judgment against Cox for defamation.

The judgment was possible because the trial court determined that Ms. Cox failed to “submit evidence suggestive of her status of a journalist,” which means she was not provided the same protection against libel that newspapers and other traditional media sources have. 

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit disagreed, and determined that the First Amendment protections offered to institutional media apply also to individual speakers who assert their statements via non-traditional media outlets such as blog posts.  

Holding that the identity of the speaker was not important in defamation cases, the Ninth Circuit rejected the notion that institutional press has First Amendment protection that individual speakers, such as bloggers, do not."

Source and to Read more: http://www.freeadvice.com/news/Government+Law/blogger-defamation-protection.htm#ixzz2zvrSLqUP 

"Bloggers all over the US are rejoicing as are we" ; Blogger Crystal Cox Gets Equal Rights for ALL Bloggers as Traditional Journalists, Institutional Press, Big Media.

"Crystal Cox is a blogger who wrote about the Obsidian Finance Group and their practices. She was not very flattering in her descriptions of the company and its principle owner. Obsidian sued Cox.

On January 14, 2011, Obsidian Finance Group, LLC, and Obsidian Senior Principal Kevin Padrick filed a defamation suit in Oregon federal court against blogger Crystal Cox. The complaint alleged that Cox had written a number of false and defamatory statements on her website, obsidianfincancesucks.com, and on “other websites.” The statements quoted in the complaint involve “tax fraud,” “fraud against the government,” “hir[ing] a hitman,” and other statements.

As the case wound through the Courts, a district court eventually decided that as a blogger, Cox did not warrant the First Amendment protections of a journalist.

Law professor Eugene Volokh and others signed onto to represent Cox.

On January 17, 2013 the Ninth Circuit Court issued its decision giving Cox the same protection as a journalist. Interestingly enough, the decision was based in part on the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.

The Court wrote, in part:

The protections of the First Amendment do not turn on whether the defendant was a trained journalist, formally affiliated with traditional news entities, engaged in conflict-of-interest disclosure, went beyond just assembling others’ writings, or tried to get both sides of a story. As the Supreme Court has accurately warned, a First Amendment distinction between the institutional press and other speakers is unworkable: “With the advent of the Internet and the decline of print and broadcast media … the line between the media and others who wish to comment on political and social issues becomes far more blurred.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 352. In defamation cases, the public-figure status of a plaintiff and the public importance of the statement at issue — not the identity of the speaker — provide the First Amendment touchstones.

Bloggers all over the US are rejoicing as are we.

The decision is short, so we are including it below the fold."

Source

http://raisedonhoecakes.com/ROH/2014/01/19/bloggers-and-first-amendment-fans-rejoice/

Neumann v. Liles, Or: Court of Appeals 2014

"CAROL C. NEUMANN and DANCING DEER MOUNTAIN, LLC, an Oregon domestic limited liability company, Plaintiffs-Appellants Cross-Respondents,

v.

CHRISTOPHER LILES, Defendant-Respondent Cross-Appellant."

"Second, relying on federal cases, defendant asserts that his statements are not defamatory because, in his view, the context of the statements demonstrates that they are figurative, rhetorical, or hyperbolic. See Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v.Cox, 812 F Supp 2d 1220, 1222-25 (D Or 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 740 F3d 1284 (9th Cir 2014) (describing test used by the Ninth Circuit to determine whether a statement is opinion or fact for defamation purposes under its First Amendment jurisprudence, and noting several examples of non-actionable hyperbole, figurative language, and rhetoric).

To the extent that extra-jurisdictional authority informs our analysis, we disagree that defendant's statements, as a whole, are hyperbolic. True, some of what defendant says in the challenged post is opinion and is hyperbolic (e.g., "worst wedding experience of my life!").

However, the bulk of the post is nonrhetorical and factual (e.g., "[t]he owners did not make the rules clear"; "when they saw something they didn't like they waited until the day of the wedding to bring it up"; "[w]e were told we had to leave at 9pm, but at 8:15 they started telling the guests that they had to leave immediately"; "[t]he `bridal suite' was a tool shed that was painted pretty, but a shed all the same"). Those factual details demonstrate that defendant's statements are not mere hyperbole and, more to the point, would not be brushed off as mere hyperbole by a reasonable reader of those statements. See Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or 99, 104-06, 593 P2d 777 (1979) (analyzing whether recipient of statements would have understood statements to defame the plaintiff in order to determine whether statements were defamatory)."

Source

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9217310593484775585&q=Obsidian+Finance+Group,+LLC+v.+Cox+citing&hl=en&as_sdt=6,48&as_vis=1

Obsidian Finance v. Crystal Cox; EQUALITY for ALL Bloggers to that of Institutional press, main stream media, traditional journalist.

"I was forwarded an article by Jeff Barnard of the AP opining on a recent Federal Court decision from the 9th Circuit regarding the 1st Amendment–the very first federal appellate ruling affording bloggers, such as myself,  legal protections similar to those of journalists generally.

While I’ve been threatened, to no result, multiple times, with lawsuits and other random attempts to dull my pen, this decision impacts beyond my desk to anyone giving wide circulation about an injustice, or an opinion on a “public issue.”

Some frame of reference.  A series of blogs I posted early last year received widespread attention, including commentary by the Miami Herald, R Street Institute and others. Not so much because of what I wrote, but…because someone I wrote about tried to stop me.

The series of articles narrowed to a public adjuster upset at my observation that his firm’s name  appeared intended to make people think he was with the government. His threat:

“…cease and desist and remove our name right away.  Failure to do so will result in a suit, naming you for damage to our reputation and name.”

Incredulous, I did no such thing.

Just the opposite. I published additional research demonstrating that his firm might be violating both state and federal law. 

In my published response (Freedom of Speech & the USA), I offered to print his full unedited reply should he care to offer one. He didn’t. I now find the links I provided to his website no longer work.

Retained counsel during the episode provided advice, much of which, if followed, would’ve restricted me from mentioning anyone by name and merely citing applicable statutes without stating that someone, anyone, may be in violation thereof–cogent but, impractical, especially when exposing that a specific name may be in violation of a specific statute. A broader application could handcuff exposing some entities committing far more egregious acts and deceptions.

In 2010, Crystal Cox, a self described “investigative blogger” published posts attacking   Obsidian Finance Group and its partners. She accused them of tax fraud, money laundering, and more. Her posts were published on websites with names like “obsidianfinancesucks.com.”
Obsidian and one of its partners sued for defamation.

The Ninth Circuit in Obsidian Finance v. Crystal Cox  used convoluted language to isolate a simple proposition–even though someone might not write for the “institutional press,” they’re entitled to protections the Constitution grants journalists.

The protections of the First Amendment do not turn on whether the defendant was a trained journalist, formally affiliated with traditional news entities, engaged in conflict-of-interest disclosure, went beyond just assembling others’ writings, or tried to get both sides of a story.

As the Supreme Court has accurately warned, a First Amendment distinction between the institutional press and other speakers is unworkable: “With the advent of the Internet and the decline of print and broadcast media . . . the line between the media and others who wish to comment on political and social issues becomes far more blurred.”

One AP article quotes Gregg Leslie of the Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press saying the ruling affirms what many have long argued: “Standards set by a 1974 U.S. Supreme Court ruling, Gertz v. Robert Welch, apply to everyone, not just journalists.”

“It’s not a special right to the news media,” he said. “So it’s a good thing for bloggers and citizen journalists and others.”

To me the real beauty of this decision, is not that millions of bloggers just like me were right  but, that we now have the media’s freedom to be wrong."

Source
http://johnsonstrategiesllc.com/1st-amendment-the-freedom-to-be-wrong

AN IMPORTANT VICTORY for FREE SPEECH. "In an important victory for free speech advocates, the Ninth Circuit has joined other courts in establishing that authors protected by the First Amendment need not be journalists to have such robust protections."

"In Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox, — F.3d —- (2014) (filed Jan. 17th, 2014), the Ninth Circuit overturned a lower court decision that limited certain First Amendment protections to institutional journalists. The Court explained that “protections of the First Amendment do not turn on whether the defendant was a trained journalist, formally affiliated with traditional news entities, engaged in conflict-of-interest disclosure, went beyond just assembling others’ writings, or tried to get both sides of a story.”

In aligning the Ninth Circuit with other circuits which have addressed the issue, the court reaffirms that negligence is the minimum legal standard for any case involving matters of public interest (and possibly all cases). To receive general damages without suffering specific harm and to receive punitive damages, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant published the statements with actual malice, meaning intentional knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.

In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme Court established the modern First Amendment framework. Public officials must prove actual malice to prove liability. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, (1967), then extended this standard to public figures. A decade later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974), the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment required a negligence standard for private defamation actions. Significantly less than the actual malice standard, it nonetheless established that there could not be liability without fault.

In Obsidian Financial Group, the Ninth Circuit does not suggest the defendant is blameless:

Crystal Cox published blog posts on several websites that she created, accusing Padrick and Obsidian of fraud, corruption, money-laundering, and other illegal activities in connection with the Summit bankruptcy. Cox apparently has a history of making similar allegations and seeking payoffs in exchange for retraction. SeeDavid Carr, When Truth Survives Free Speech, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 2011, at B1. Padrick and Obsidian sent Cox a cease-and-desist letter, but she continued posting allegations.

The accusations and statements, however, were difficult to view as factual assertions. Where there were assertions of fact, the court explains, the plaintiff must establish the negligence of the statements.

The Ninth Circuit also sidestepped the issue whether the Gertz negligence standard applies to matters of purely private concern. It noted the unresolved question, when it stated that “the Supreme Court has ‘never considered whether the Gertz balance obtains when the defamatory statements involve no issue of public concern.’” (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 757 (1985) (plurality opinion)).

Instead, the Ninth Circuit noted that the blog was made available to the public at large, just as every blog does. Moreover, the court noted that “public allegations that someone is involved in crime generally are speech on a matter of public concern.” So instead of answering whether the negligence standard applies to private matters, the court expanded the realm of public discourse to almost any public accusation.

This strategy has the effect of expanding the negligence standard to almost any claim. It may leave certain personal matters personal, though this is unclear. It could also leave certain formats, such as personal emails, texts, and friends’ lists as matters of purely private concern, but undoubtedly many of allegedly defamatory posts on such platforms will also be matters of public concern.

The distinction between matters of public concern and purely private matters has less and less meaning, and the distinction is likely to continue to erode in the context of defamation, though perhaps remain relevant in some issues involving privacy.

Nonetheless, the case is an important victory for free speech interests. Of course, this does not mean anything can be published with impunity. Negligence is not a terribly difficult test to meet and those plaintiffs who have truly been harmed will still have their day in court. It is difficult to be the subject of online attacks, but the rules of law should apply equally to all speakers, journalists, bloggers, and citizens alike. In the Ninth Circuit, it now does."

Source
http://lawandinformatics.com/2014/01/23/ninth-circuit-provides-important-protection-to-bloggers/

"“This case is the first one from a federal court of appeals that specifically protects the rights of bloggers,” said UCLA constitutional law professor Eugene Volokh, who represented Cox without charge on appeal.

Crystal Cox held her ground and held on to this Appeal, for the Greater Good of ALL whistleblowers, citizen journalists, and anti-corruption bloggers.

"SAN FRANCISCO -- A federal appeals court unanimously overturned a defamation award against a blogger Friday, ruling that 1st Amendment protections for traditional news media extend to individuals posting on the Web.

“The protections of the 1st Amendment do not turn on whether the defendant was a trained journalist, formally affiliated with traditional news entities,”  Judge Andrew D. Hurwitz wrote for a three-judge panel of the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.

The panel said its holding was the first of its kind within the 9th Circuit but that other circuit courts already have extended protections for journalists to individual speakers.

.....

“This case is the first one from a federal court of appeals that specifically protects the rights of bloggers,” said UCLA constitutional law professor Eugene Volokh, who represented Cox without charge on appeal.

He said the ruling would also protect other individuals, including those who leaflet and who speak out on behalf of politicians or activist groups.

Source
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-blogger-1st-amendment-20140117,0,5295817.story#ixzz2zBErr0z7

DEMAND Transparency and Accountability. YOU are the NEWS. No Governing Body has a RIGHT to tell you what is NEWS. You see it, video it, know it, research it.. it is NEWS and it is also YOUR First Amendment RIGHT. "a Legitimate Journalist" as a Label is BULLSHIT plain and simple and a Violation of YOUR Rights, PERIOD.

"Currently being debated by the Senate, but rarely discussed on mainstream television, is the Shield Law. While on the surface it may seem to be rather innocuous, some of the language in it and its implications are quite problematic for journalists.

A Shield Law is a law which “provides statutory protection for the ‘reporters’ privilege’— legal rules which protect journalists against the government requiring them to reveal confidential sources or other information.”[1] Generally, this is a positive occurrence as journalists are much more able to conduct their work and bring information to public light if they do not need to worry about having to reveal their sources. While Shield Laws have occurred in the past, they have only been on the state level. This currently proposed Shield Law is the first one to reach the federal level and the main goal is to protect journalists from having to reveal confidential sources in federal cases.[2]

However, there are certain instances in which journalists will have to reveal sources, such as “(1) The party seeking disclosure has exhausted all reasonable alternative sources of the information; (2) The requested information is essential to resolving the matter; (3) Disclosure of the requested information would not be contrary to the public interest; and (4) In criminal cases, if the requesting party is the federal government, the government must show that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has occurred.”[3]

While overall it may seem like a good bill, there are a number of problems with this Shield Law, officially known as the Free Flow of Information Act of 2013. For starters, this law would “allow the government to seize reporters’ records without notifying them for 45 days – a period of time that could be renewed by a judge 45 additional days – if investigators convince a judge pre-notification ‘would pose a clear and substantial threat to the integrity of a criminal investigation.’”[4] This power of seizing records without notifying reporters was used most recently in regards to the Associated Press, when the federal government seized their phone records in May of last year, with the government only saying that “they were needed for investigation of an unspecified criminal matter.”[5] Oh yes! What transparency and accountability! Infringing upon the First Amendment rights of reporters and then only giving what is essentially a BS, purposefully vague explanation.

In addition to this, the government can force journalists to give up information in the name of national security.[6] This is quite worrying as the US government has time and time again been involved in operations of entrapment.[7,8] Due to this, they could potentially have a scenario where they create a case of entrapment, label it terrorism, and then force all journalists to give up information on any and all sources as well as seize their records under the guise of national security.

Yet in this current bill, not only can the government continue to engage in the above behavior, but they are also defining who is and who is not a journalist. Initially, the bill defined a journalist as “a person who has a ‘primary intent to investigate events and procure material’ in order to inform the public by regularly gathering information through interviews and observations” and added the stipulation that “The person also must intend to report on the news at the start of obtaining any protected information and must plan to publish that news.”[9] This seems to be rather fine as it would include mainstream and independent journalists. However, the situation became problematic when in September 2013, an amendment to the bill was proposed that- let’s just say- ‘more clearly’ defined who and who was not a journalist.

Kevin Gostolza of Firedoglake discussed this amendment last year and it would be appropriate to quote him now at some length:

A “covered journalist,” under the amendment, would be the following: an employee, independent contractor, or agent of an entity or service that disseminates news or information by means of newspaper; nonfiction book; wire service; news agency; news website, mobile application or other news or information service (whether distributed digitally or other wise); news program; magazine or other periodical, whether in print, electronic, or other format; or through television or radio broadcast, multichannel video programming distributor (as such term is defined in section 602(13) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 522(13)), or motion picture for public showing… That person must also have the “primary intent to investigate events and procure material in order to disseminate to the public news or information concerning local, national, or international events or other matters of public interest.” Or, that person should be engaged in the “regular gathering, preparation, collection, photographing, recording, writing, editing, reporting or publishing on such matters.” A person would also qualify as a “covered journalist” if they had experience in journalism and had “substantially contributed, as an author, editor, photographer, or producer, to a significant number of articles, stories, programs, or publications” in the past twenty years. As Feinstein said, it would “cover a legitimate journalist such as a Dan Rather who leaves his media entity and takes to publishing freelance stories on the web.”[10] (emphasis added)

Now, let’s begin to take those paragraphs apart and analyze them, bit by bit.

In the first paragraph, the law defines a journalist as “an employee, independent contractor, or agent of an entity or service that disseminates news or information” and then goes on to define the many mediums by which the news can be disseminated. Some of this language seems to be problematic. What exactly do they mean by “independent contractor?” Do they mean a freelancer? Do they mean someone like myself who researches and writes independently?"

Source and Full Article
http://www.globalresearch.ca/freedom-of-the-press-and-the-shield-law-protecting-the-public-from-independent-alternatives-to-the-mainstream-media/5377081

Do Search Engines HAVE First Amendment Rights? Does Google Blogger Have First Amendment Rights? Is Google a Publisher?

"As the internet evolves the rights and responsibilities of its users become more clearly defined.  Courts have found themselves in the position of having to apply the common law precedent to the Internet.  A recent case out of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is helping to legally define the protections of bloggers on the Internet. Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC  v. Cox, No. 12-35238, D.C. No. 3:11-cv-00057-HZ (9th. Cir. Jan. 17, 2014).

The facts are not as clear as I would have liked, so I will try my best to distill them.  Summit Accommodators voluntarily petititoned for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in late 2008. The defendant Kevin Padrick, a senior principal and co-founder of Obsidian was appointed as a bankruptcy trustee. Crystal Cox is a self-appointed real estate whistleblower.  Cox created and wrote content for blogs: http://www.obsidianfinancesucks.com andhttp://www.summit1031sucks.com.  Some of the claims Cox made about Padrick on the blog, he is: corrupt, committed tax fraud, and called him derogatory names.  Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, CV-11-57-HZ, 2011 WL 2745849 (D. Or. July 7, 2011).  Obsidian Financial Group and Padrick sent Cox a cease and desist letter, but she continued anyway.

One observation the district court made was Cox did not try to attempt any neutrality.  With domain names like http://www.obsidianfinancesucks.comvisitors should know that the blog will take a critical stance, “which expressly discloses its bias against bankruptcy courts, bankruptcy trustees.”  Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, CV-11-57-HZ, 2011 WL 2745849 (D. Or. July 7, 2011) adhered to in part on reconsideration, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (D. Or. 2011) aff’d, 12-35238, D.C. No 3:11-cv-00057-HZ (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 2014).  Many of the blog posts were not counted as libelous because they were based upon opinion rather than fact.  However, the district court found one blog post libelous in nature because it made “fairly specific allegations [that] a reasonable reader could understand . . .to imply a provable fact assertion.”Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1233 (D. Or. 2011) aff’d,12-35238, 2014 WL 185376 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 2014).

Cox then asserted that the First Amendment offered her protections from liability deriving from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  First, she claimed that the subject matter was of public concern.  Second, both Padrick and Obsidian were public figures.  The judge rejected both of these arguments saying that neither Obsidian nor Padrick sought to be a public or limited public figure.  Instead, Cox created the controversy around them.

Both parties appealed.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that since the New York Timescase, courts have not given any extra protection to journalists than they have anyone else. “[E]very other circuit to consider the issue has held that the First Amendment defamation rules in Sullivan and its progeny apply equally to the institutional press and individual speakers. . . We agree with our sister circuits.”Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 12-35238, D.C. No. 3:11-cv-00057-HZ (9th. Cir. Jan. 17, 2014).

The Court went even further by saying that Padrick’s actions were a matter of public concern.  Since Padrick was the trustee of failed ponzi scheme that involved tens of millions of dollars his actions were of public interest.  Furthermore, because Cox accused Padrick of fraud among other things, her accusations were also a matter of public concern.

One thing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not address is how she made her accusations.  Some individuals have asserted that Cox’s motives  are not all that pure and even go so far as to call her manipulative with financial motives, rather than a journalist. 

Critics say because her day job is to manage people’s reputations on the internet and when acting as an investigative journalist, Cox has registered dozens of domain names to negatively influence the search results of a person’s name. Cox will then ask for a fee in order to repair one’s reputation.  See Complaint at 2-4 Randazza v. Cox, 920 F. Supp.2d 1151 (D. Nev. 2013) (No. 12-02040).

In my opinion, part of the issue is definitely how Cox made the speech.  By linking together multiple websites together to voice her opinion, Cox manipulated the search engine results.  Professor Eugene Volokh, who represented Cox at the oral argument in front of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, argued previously that search engine rankings are a type of corporate speech made by the search engines.  If Professor Volokh’s argument is believed, then Cox’s speech should not be considered pure at all.

I do not believe there is any case law on whether search engine manipulation can be considered defamation or not.  However, this technological part of the argument is something that the Court missed in their analysis.  In a later post, I will analyze Professor Volokh’s argument about search engine rankings being considered speech, and the logical extension, if search engine rankings are manipulated can that be considered defamation."

Source
http://commonlawaz.wordpress.com/tag/speech/

First Amendment Protection for Search Engines, Eugene Volokhhttp://www.volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/SearchEngineFirstAmendment.pdf

oh and P.S. - My Day JOB at that Time was a Real Estate Broker Owner, and my "Day Job" has NEVER EVER been a "reputation manager" .. ahh but who cares about Factoids RIGHT?

oh and I registered the Domains NOT to negatively Influence the Search Engines but to use MODERN, New Media to EXPOSE CORRUPTION.. and ya Kevin Padrick and Marc Randazza are CORRUPT.. do some investigatin'

oh and Here is the FULL docket of Nevada SLAPP suit and Perjury of Marc Randazza http://ia701205.us.archive.org/2/items/gov.uscourts.nvd.91330/gov.uscourts.nvd.91330.docket.html

Obsidian v. Cox Lower Court Docket
http://ia600403.us.archive.org/9/items/gov.uscourts.ord.101036/gov.uscourts.ord.101036.docket.html

First Amendment to the United States Constitution

"The Ninth Circuit Court ruled in Obsidian Finance Group LLC and Kevin Padrick vs. Crystal Cox (2014)^[178] ruled that liability for a defamatory blog post involving a matter of public concern cannot be imposed without proof of fault and actual damages.^[179]

Bloggers saying libelous things about private citizens concerning public matters can only be sued if they’re negligent i.e. the plaintiff must prove the defendants negligence – the same standard that applies when news media are sued.

The federal appellate court thus essentially said that journalists and bloggers are one and the same when it comes to the First Amendment^[180] and, in the words of Eugene Volokh, a professor at the UCLA School of Law, that nonprofessional press, especially bloggers, "for First Amendment purposes, have the same rights as others do, as for example the institutional media does."^[181]

The unanimous three-judge panel rejected the argument that the negligence standard established for private defamation actions by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1974's Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc. only applied to "the institutional press."^[181] "The Gertz court did not expressly limit its holding to the defamation of institutional media defendants," Judge Andrew Hurwitz wrote for the three-judge panel. "And, although the Supreme Court has never directly held that the Gertz rule applies beyond the institutional press, it has repeatedly refused in non-defamation contexts to accord greater First Amendment protection to the institutional media than to other speakers."^[181] Hurwitz wrote: "The protections of the First Amendment do not turn on whether the defendant was a trained journalist, formally affiliated with traditional news entities, engaged in conflict-of-interest disclosure, went beyond just assembling others' writings or tried to get both sides of a story. …

In defamation cases, the public-figure status of a plaintiff and the public importance of the statement at issue -- not the identity of the speaker -- provide the First Amendment touchstones."<sup>[182]"

Source
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution</sup>

"I believe that keeping silent when an injustice is taking place is condoning it." Crystal Cox Case

"

Crystal Cox Whistleblower

I quote India Today Group chairman and editor-in-chief Aroon Puri, from indianexpress.com:

The role of the media is to question and uncover facts that interested parties are keen to suppress and verify information, rather than resort to activism and drive an agenda, a panel discussion on responsible journalism at the CII National Conference has brought out.

He goes on further to say, according to his rulebook on journalism, “the biggest poison in journalism is journalists, proprietors and editors who have an agenda, who have to promote a point of view or an interest” and that activism should be nowhere near journalism. But if it “happens as a byproduct”, he said “I am okay with it”

He said according to his rulebook on journalism, “the biggest poison in journalism is journalists, proprietors and editors who have an agenda, who have to promote a point of view or an interest” and that activism should be nowhere near journalism. But if it “happens as a byproduct”, he said “I am okay with it”

“Activism is a good idea and a lot of people are full-time activists. But by being activist, media gives good activists a bad name. The job of the media is not to be activist but to be active. Our training has been to avoid activism and to be scrutinising,”

"

The “new media” obviously concerns many politicians like Feinstein, who show the same hostility to bloggers as her predecessors once showed to the media before New York Times v. Sullivan. While the issues are not identical between the torts doctrines and media shield laws, the ruling undermines the argument that there is a clear line between bloggers and conventional reporters in dealing with public disputes and allegations. We have still not resolved how to draw the line (if such a line is possible) between conventional and new media. What is significant is that this court is refusing to expose bloggers to the type of pre-Sullivan liability that would dramatically chill Internet speech.

Crystal L. Cox, Whistleblower Media, Poking a Big of Fun at Big Media"

Source

http://towardchange.wordpress.com/2014/03/31/panel-ruled-that-bloggers-are-entitled-to-the-same-protections-as-journalists/

Badmouthing the Bankruptcy Trustee and the First Amendment

"  As a Chapter 7 panel trustee, I sometimes annoy (to use a mild term) the occasional party - either because they don't understand the bankruptcy process, have an inflated sense of self-entitlement, or merely because my actions are inimical to their sense of well being.

A California trustee, in a similar situation, found himself in the cross-hairs of a somewhat critical blogger in a Ninth Circuit decision that defined the scope of a blogger's right under the First Amendment to publicly criticize a trustee's actions. Not just a bankruptcy case, the Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox decision provides a road map to applying First Amendment decisions to online commentary.

Kevin Padrick was appointed as the Chapter 11 trustee for Summit Accomodators, Inc. shortly after it filed its Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. He soon found himself within the cross-hairs of a Crystal Cox, who commenced blogging about the bankruptcy in a manner critical of Mr. Patrick (some examples: "the facts of what Kevin Padrick of Obsidian Finance did that was probably illegal are washed under the carpet, never to be seen again" and "He is smart and good at his job, which is apparently screwing people out of their money").

She accused Padrick of fraud, corruption, money-laundering and other illegal activities in connection with the Summit bankruptcy. In response, Padrick and his company, Obsidian Finance Group, LLC, sued Cox for defamation.

The underlying framework derives from two Supreme Court cases - New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. In Sullivan, the Supreme Court stated that defamation against a public official is only actionable if made with "actual malice." The plaintiff must show that the writer published the statement with actual knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard to the truth. Under Gertz, in a private defamation action mere negligence in making a false statement is sufficient to create liability.

Padrick was arguing for an even more lenient standard, arguing that the Gertz negligence standard applied only to protect journalists, or, alternatively, where a matter of public concern was involved.

The District Court held that most of Cox's posts were constitutionally protected opinion, with the exception of one allegation - that Padrick had failed to pay taxes due from the bankruptcy estate. That claim went to a jury, which found in favor of Padrick.

After Cox's motion for a new trial was denied, she appealed the case to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held (a) that First Amendment protections were available to a blogger, (b) that Padrick was not a "public officer" but that the bankruptcy case was a matter of public concern, thus requiring a higher standard before liability could attach, and (c) that liability could not be imposed without a showing of fault or actual damages.

The Circuit Court started with analyzing whether Cox could avail herself of First Amendment protections, or whether those protections were limited to journalists. Citing to the Supreme Court case, Citizens United, as well as decisions in the Second, Third, Fourth, Eighth, and DC Circuits, the court held that a First Amendment distinction between the institutional press and other speakers is unworkable. In defamation cases, the speaker's status as a professional journalist is not relevant - First Amendment protections derive from the defamed party's status and the public importance of the matter being discussed.

The Court then turned to the question of whether the matter was of public concern. It held that it was. Padrick was appointed as a bankruptcy trustee of a company that had been accused of diverting funds from investors.

His actions, and particularly the allegations that he was acting improperly in his position, were a matter of public concern. Accordingly, Padrick needed to prove that Cox had acted negligently in making her statements to obtain a judgment for actual damages incurred. Also, the jury could not award presumed damages, under Gertz, unless it found that Cox acted with actual malice.

The Court also considered whether Padrick, as a bankruptcy trustee, was a public official. If he was, then the stricter New York Times standard would apply to the entire case.

The Court noted that Padrick was neither elected nor appointed to a government position, and did not exercise control over governmental affairs. He merely was appointed as a stand-in for a debtor in possession. As such, Padrick was not a public official for purposes of defamation law.

The case was remanded back to the District Court for further proceedings. So, perhaps, the matter will have to be retried, with Padrick having to prove either that Cox acted with actual malice, in order to obtain an award of presumed damages, or having to prove both that she acted negligently and also that he suffered actual damage as a result of her posts. As for me, I was told when I got into this business that Chapter 7 trustees need to have a thick skin."

Source
http://tech-bankruptcy.blogspot.com/2014/03/badmouthing-bankruptcy-trustee-and.html

"Federal Court Officially Protects Blogger’s Freedom of Speech!"

"Are internet blog posts afforded the same 1st amendment rights granted to those working with traditional news media?

Yes, according to this recent 9th Circuit Court case which appears to be the the first federal case that specifically addresses and protects the rights of bloggers.

Internet writers can now take a deep breath and write a little more freely.

In defamation suits, bloggers and citizen journalists are at par with the professional journalists. The legal standards for judging their actions should be the same in relation to the First Amendment.

Crystal Cox, the blogger in question, was taken to court by Obsidian Finance Group, for having allegedly defamed the company.  In her blog, Cox accused the Finance group of fraud, corruption and other deeds of misconduct.  While Cox posted various blogs about this company, the one post that went to trial contained allegations that one of the company’s principals had failed to pay taxes for a company that filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy."

Source and Full Crystal Cox Case article
http://rauschlaw.wordpress.com/tag/1st-amendment/

Accuardi v. Fredericks; Obsidian v. Cox Citing

"Finally, Accuardi relies on this court’s decision in Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, CV-11-57-HZ, 2011 WL 5999334, *6 (D Or Nov. 30, 2011). In that case, the defendant published statements on the Internet that the plaintiff had committed tax fraud while administering assets as a court-appointed trustee in the bankruptcy proceedings of a private corporation.

The court found that those statements were not a matter of public concern because they did not involve a question for public discourse, but strictly related to the handling of a private company’s bankruptcy affairs, citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323, 350 (1974).

The focus of Fredericks’s statements about Accuardi, unlike those about the plaintiff in Obsidian, is how Accuardi’s involvement with the private company affects the public.

Fredericks’s scrutiny is not limited to the private management of the Telemarketing Entities, but questions how that management resulted in alleged robo-calling to the citizens on the National Do Not Call Registry and violations of federal and state law.

More importantly, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with this court’s conclusion in Obsidian that the allegations of tax fraud were not a public issue because “[p]ublic allegations that someone is involved in crime generally are speech on a matter of public concern.” Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 12-35238, 2014 WL 185376, at *5 (9th Cir Jan. 17, 2014). As explained above, Fredericks’s statements implying that Accuardi is violating the law involve a matter of public concern. Thus, Fredericks has met his initial burden. "

Source
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/oregon/ordce/3:2013cv01825/114216/40

"Blogger's First Amendment Rights Upheld" - Crystal Cox Case

"Bloggers can rest easier as they post articles from their computers.  They have equal First Amendment rights with trained journalists.

That was the recent decision of the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in a defamation lawsuit brought against a blogger in California.

The decision went even further, confirming that First Amendment rights are applicable to everyone, and that everyday citizens and Pulitizer Prize-winning journalists journalists all possess the same rights under the First Amendment.

The unanimous 9th Circuit decision reversed a $2.5 million judgment against blogger Crystal Cox by Obsidian Finance Group and its co-founder Kevin Padrick.

The verdict followed a nearly inexplicable District Court opinion allowing the case to go to trial on the basis that Ms Cox could not produce evidence that he was a trained journalists engaged in that profession, that he could not claim the First Amendment protection of the New York Times v. Sullivan case.

For the decision in Obsidian Finance Group v. Cox, CLICK HERE.

For most First Amendment lawyers, the surprise was not the 9th Circuit's reversal, but the District Court's original decision, which seemed to go against a half-century of law to the contrary, although seldom applied to the new technology of blogging.

The lawsuit arose from a post by Ms Cox accusing Obsidian and Padrick of tax fraud in the handing of a company that was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

The 9th Circuit covers most of the western-most United States, including California.  The United States Circuit Courts of Appeal are the second highest federal courts, next to the US Supreme Court."

source and Full Article
http://lawforwriters.blogspot.com/2014/01/bloggers-first-amendment-rights-upheld.html

Crystal Cox Case; Ninth Court Decision NOT a Gift. The Law is the Law and Judge Hernandez violated it, PERIOD.